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Abstract
In this note, we argue that structure of production sets for markets with ex-
ternalities precludes the possibility of interior points being optimal. Even in an
economy in which rhe externalities are not classical is structure an ordinary mono-
tonieity assumption is sufficient to guarantee that all optimal production plans are
an the boundary of the production sets. Thus, Starrett's assumption of no Local
Pareto Satiation is not necessary. This focuses attention on the real reason that
we can not count of decentralizing production of an optional plan through prices in
such an economies: the fundamental nonconvexities identified by Starrett (1974).

Starrer t's 1974 paper "Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory of External
ities" is one of the important contributions to the theoretical understanding of this
classical problem. His approach is to define the extended Arrow commodity space
associated with an economy with externalities, and then to examine the properties
of the production set. Recall this extended space is obtained by introducing a set of
"artificial commodities" which may be thought of as each agents' observation of the
each other agents' consumption or production level of each good. In his second sec-
tion he demonstrates very clearly that there is little hope of ever supporting optimal
production plans in the extended space due the a "fundamental nonconvexity" that
the presence of externalities introduces. The point that externalities and convex
production sets are essentially incompatible is extremely important and (I think)
not widely enough appreciated in Public Finance circles.
I do not take issue with the Starrett's conclusions about fundamental non-
convexities in this comment, but rather the point he raises in the first section of
his paper. Starrett notes that even in an appropriately defined Arrow commodity
space, the optimal production plan must be on the boundary of the production set
if there is to be possibility of supporting it by a price system. He worries there
might be a "keeping up with the Jones" effect that results in interior points of
the production set being optimal. He calls this effect "local Pareto satiation" and
argues that "Non- Local Pareto Satiation" (NLPS) is a necessary condition for the
existence of prices supporting an optimal production plan. I argue here that NLPS
is always satisfied as a consequence of the structure of the Arrow commodity space.
Thus, while Starrett's conclusions are perfectly true, the assumption of NLPS in
the hypothesis of his theorems is redundant.
The problem that Starrett has in mind can be easily illustrated with a simple
example. Consider an economy with only two agents: Jones and Smith, and two
goods: acres of lawn for Jones and acres of lawn for Smith. Denote these two goods
as X J . and X s . Let the feasible allocations for these two goods be described by
X J < 4 — X 5 . Starrett imagines a situation in which each of these two goods has
an associated negative externality. This is because Smith envies Jones' lawn and
inversely. This external effect might be so strong that even though two acres of lawn
for each agent is a feasible allocation, they would both be better off if they each
had only one acre of lawn. This is despite the fact that for each agent, having a
bigger lawn is always better for any fixed size of his neighbor's lawn. An arms race
might be a real world example of this effect. In Starrett's language, one acre of lawn
each is a point of local Pareto satiation. He concludes that since no prices could
possibly support this interior Pareto efficient allocation, NLPS must be assumed to
guarantee that all optional plans are one the boundary of the feasible set.
There are two reasons NLPS is an unnecessary assumption. First, recall that
we are looking for supporting prices in the extended Arrow commodity space,
not in the original goods space. If this extended space is defined in the tradi-
tional way, two goods are added to the example. These are Smith's observation
of Jones' lawn and Jones' observation of Smith's lawn. Let the four commodi-
ties be denoted by X 1. where i,j E {S,J}, and this is interpreted as j's observa-
tion of Vs lawn. For the standard case of externalities, observations are jointly
produced. The extended production set can be described by three expressions:
XJ < 4 — X§,X§ = Xj,XJ = X$. Here is the essential point: these equa-
tions describe a 2-dimensional manifold in a 4-dimensional space. In general, If
there are N goods, F firms, and C consumers, the feasible set will always be an N-
dimensional manifold in an N(F-(-C) 2 -dimensional Arrow commodity space. Since
such a manifold can never have an interior in a larger dimensional space, it follows
that regardless of which production plan is optimal, it will necessarily be on the
boundary of the extended production set. This means that it will be supportable
by prices under the right convexity conditions. Of course, these are prices for all
the commodities. It will still not generally be possible to support the optimum
in the original production space since the projection of the optimal plan from the
extended space may very well be in the interior of the original space. But this is of
no consequence.
Suppose instead that we want to consider something not quite as rigid as the
classical externality model. In particular, suppose that for some reason outputs
and observations of outputs are not strictly jointly produced. For example, what if
it were possible to costlessly build a fence between the lawns of Smith and Jones
that would partially or fully obscure observation of the other's lawn. In this case
the expressions describing the production possibilities become Xj < 4 — X^X^ >
XjyXj > X<$. The production set is no longer a submanifold of the Arrow com-
modity space and an such has an interior. Even here there is a reason that NLPS
is not required. All that we need to prevent the possibility of an interior opti-
mum is a standard monotonicity assumption. This will ordinarily be satisfied in
such a commodity space, and in any event, is no stronger than what is needed for
economies without externalities. This is much weaker that the sufficient condition
that Starrett offers to guarantee a boundary optimum, namely that there be one
good (like money) that in which all agents have monotonic preferences, and which
may be consumed with out generating any externalities. In our example, all agents
have weekly monotone preferences over all four goods. The optimal allocation in
this case involves somehow deciding on an exact division of the four acres of lawn
between the two agents, and then building the fence. In this case, of course, we are
essentially freely disposing of the externality. This obscures the externality aspect
of the problem to some degree. Still the point remains that monotonicity on the
extended space is sufficient insure that all Pareto optimal production plans are on
the boundary of the extended production sets.
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